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ONE PERSON-ONE VOTE: THE PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARIES AND OTHER NATIONAL CONVENTION
DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESSES
Since the holding of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr' that
claims of inequality of legislative representation present justiciable
controversies, the Court has developed the principle of one person-one
vote.2 At the heart of reapportionment is the "right of a citizen to
equal representation and to have his vote weighted equally with those
of all other citizens. . . ."I This standard has been applied to elections to the United States House of Representatives, 4 to both houses of

state legislatures, 5 to statewide offices6 and to a variety of local governmental units. However, the Supreme Court has never held that the
presidential nominating processes must similarly be governed by this
principle.
In the aftermath of the 1968 presidential campaign both major
political parties appointed committees to review the presidential elec-

toral process. 8 As a part of this general reform movement, six states
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. The term one person-one vote is used here in recognition of the need to
develop neutral terms of jurisprudence. This term was first employed in the case of
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), but its usage has never gained judicial
favor. The terms one voter-one vote and one citizen-one vote have been rejected
because of their technical inaccuracy. Since in legislative apportionment districts
are drawn by reference to census reports which include nonvoters-persons under the
age of 18 and those who are not registered-and noncitizens such as resident aliens,
the use of those terms would be incorrect.
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
4. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394
U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
5. Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Bums
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
6. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). But see n.81 infra.
7. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (county supervisors); Hadley v.
Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (junior college trustees); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (county commissioners).
8. Mandate for Reform: A Report of the Commission on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, 117 CoNG. Ruc. E9841
[2571
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enacted presidential primary laws in the four years following that election.' The courts have joined the states and the political parties in
the scrutiny of the procedures by which presidential candidates are
nominated. Among the lower courts that have considered the issue,
there is a division of authority. This note will examine these cases and
the various arguments concerning the application of the one personone vote principle to the political parties in the selection of national
convention delegates.
Although there is a distinction between presidential primaries and
other systems of delegate selection, this note will argue that the principle of one person-one vote is applicable to both the primary and nonprimary methods of selection. In the presidential primaries, voters
have the opportunity to express their preferences directly either by
voting for delegates to the convention or for a presidential candidate.
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1971). Rule 29, adopted by the 1968 Republican National Convention, authorized the convening of the Delegates and Organizations Committee
which was to submit recommendations to the 1972 convention.
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 12-1 to -2 (1957), as amended (Supp. 1972);
Act of Feb. 22, 1972, No. 60, Mich. Pub. Acts; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-8-33 to -40
(1953), as amended (Interim Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-213.1-.10 (1972);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-12.1-1 to .1-16 (1969), as amended, Act of Jan. 26, 1972,
Ch. 2, R.I. Pub. Laws; Presidential Preference Primary Act of 1971, ch. 102, § 1
Tenn. Acts.
However, reform of presidential primary laws within the U.S. Congress failed to
secure passage. Despite art. II, § 1 of the Constitution, which confers the power to
determine the manner of the appointment of presidential electors upon state legislatures, it seems clear that Congress could constitutionally legislate in this area. In
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), the Court upheld federal legislation
that required the reporting of contributions and expenditures by political committees
in presidential elections. The Court there stated only that Congress has an inherent
power to preserve the purity of presidential elections. Id. at 544. More recently in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a majority of the Court upheld congressional legislation that lowered the voting age to eighteen in federal elections and prohibited states from imposing residency requirements or from closing voter registration
more than thirty days before elections for presidential electors.
Justice Black,
expressing his own view of the case while writing the opinion of the Court stated:
"It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of
presidential elections than it has over congressional elections." 400 U.S. at 124. "This
power arises from the nature of our constitutional system of government and from
the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. at 124 n.7. It would also appear that legislation could be based upon section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision
was used by the Court to validate an act of Congress abolishing literacy tests in all
elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Several bills and resolutions
proposing reform of the presidential nominating process were introduced before the 92nd
Congress; S. 3566 and 3655, S.J. Res. 214, 215, and 249, H.R. 14661, 14695, 14904,
15000, and 15395, H.J. Res. 1106, 1109, 1114, 1118, 1125, and 1128, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (1972).
However, the possibility that any of these proposals
would have been passed into law seemed small. See 118 CONG. REc. S3714 (daily ed.
March 9, 1972) (comments of Senator Smith).
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In the nonprimary states, delegates are selected by state or congressional district conventions or by the state committee of the party.
Voter participation is limited generally to the selection only of representatives on the state committee or to the state or congressional conventions. Voter influence in the nonprimary states is therefore only
indirect. Yet even this indirect vote is an integral part of the process
which leads to the election of the president. Therefore, as this note
will contend, nonprimary selection methods are subject to the same
constitutional standards which have been applied to the primaries and
to the allocation of convention delegates among the states.
The Presidential Franchise-Preliminary Considerations
Upon first analysis it might appear that judicial scrutiny of the
manner in which the president is selected is foreclosed by the Constitution. Under the Constitution there is no enumerated right that the
president be popularly elected. Article II, section 1 requires only that
the president be elected by the vote of the Electoral College and
leaves the manner by which the presidential electors are chosen up to
the states. As the Supreme Court has said, "the appointment and
mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States under
the Constitution."1
No case has ever held that there is a constitutional right to choose presidential electors by popular vote. 1 ' Thus,
in the early days of the republic the states employed a variety of
methods of selecting electors. In some instances they were chosen
directly by the state legislature; in other cases they were selected by
procedures which combined elements of both legislative and popular
determination."However, it is clear that if the state provides for the popular election of the presidential electors, that right cannot be unconstitutionally
encumbered. Although unquestionably article I, section 1 of the
Constitution "does grant extensive power to the States to pass laws
regulating the selection of electors . . .these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way
that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."' 3 Since
10. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
11. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), did not reach this issue. "It is
unnecessary to decide ... whether States may select them [presidential electors]
through appointment rather than by popular vote, or whether there is a constitutional
right to vote for them. Id. at 38 (Douglas, J. concurring).
12. See generally McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28-36 (1892), for a more
complete history of how states selected their presidential electors during the nineteenth century.
13. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). Earlier the Court had somewhat equivocally held that the Article II, § 1 power is "subject to possible constitutional limitations." See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 227 (1952).
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"the same tests to determine discrimination or abridgement should be
applied to the primary as are applied to the general election,"' 4 judicial
scrutiny of the presidential electoral processes at either the primary or
final stages is not foreclosed.
Before confronting the issue of the application of the one personone vote principle to the delegate selection processes and the presidential primaries, however, certain preliminary issues must be considered. These issues include the political question doctrine and the
presence of state action.
Political Question
In apportionment cases the issue of justiciability, which is distinct from the issue of jurisdiction,"' revolves around the political question doctrine. Although Colegrove v. Green 6 was once widely cited
as considering apportionment issues nonjusticiable political questions,
a majority of the Court in fact held apportionment issues to be justiciable controversies. The case was decided by a four to three plurality
with Chief Justice Stone and Justice Jackson not participating. However, in concurring with the plurality opinion of Justice Frankfurter
which dismissed the action, Justice Rutledge stated that "this Court
has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against the objection
that the issues are not justiciable."' 7 The uncertainty of the application of the doctrine was not removed until South v. Peters,', a seven
to two decision holding that the litigation of apportionment issues was
prohibited by the political question doctrine. Colegrove had admonished the courts "not to enter this political thicket."'" However, the
subsequent decision of Baker v. Carr20 held that claims of legislative
malapportionment presented justiciable controversies and thereby effectively overruled Colegrove and its progeny. No Supreme Court
apportionment case subsequent to Baker has been decided under the
political question doctrine.
The recent Supreme Court case of O'Brien v. Brown21 should not
be construed on political question grounds as authority against the ap14.

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).

15. A significant distinction is to be made between the issues of jurisdiction and
those of justiciability. Absent jurisdiction no consideration is possible, whereas "[iun
the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed.
...Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
16. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

17.

Id. at 565.

18. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).

19. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
20.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

21. 92 S.Ct. 2718 (1972). The decision of the Supreme Court was rendered at
a special term. Special terms are extremely rare and have apparently been convened
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plication of one person-one vote standards to the delegate selection
processes. The litigation in O'Brien arose when the credentials committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention interpreted party
rules as prohibiting winner-take-all primaries. This led to the unseating of 151 McGovern delegates from California, which held a winnertake-all primary, and their replacement with delegates committed to
vote for other presidential candidates in proportion to the primary
vote. The court of appeals, after reviewing party guidelines and resolutions, held that party rules did not ban winner-take-all primaries.
On due process grounds, the court reseated the McGovern delegates. 2
In staying the judgment of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court placed great weight upon three factors. First, the Court suggested that the haste with which the case was argued and decided was
a critical factor. It concluded its opinion by stating that action should
not be taken "under the circumstances and time pressures surrounding
the actions brought.12 3 Second, the Court intimated that the action
was not yet ripe for decision since only the credentials committee had
ruled and the national convention had not yet acted. 24 Third, the
Court indicated that consideration of the case was prohibited by the
political question doctrine. It stated that highly important questions
of justiciability were presented and noted the absence of judicial precedent for intervention "into the deliberative processes of a national political convention. . . involving as they
do, relationships of great deli'2 5
cacy and essentially political in nature.
While the grant of the stay was justifiable upon either the time or
ripeness factors, any reliance on the political question doctrine seems
inappropriate. The reference by the Court to Luther v. Borden2
must be viewed with some puzzlement. In Borden the Court was
called upon to determine which of two opposing Rhode Island governments was legitimate. The Borden Court declined to make such a
determination on the grounds that such a decision could be made only
by the Congress or the president 27 However, this factor of commitonly three times in history: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Rosenberg v.
United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
22. No. 72-1628 D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972. The court of appeals was also called
upon to determine whether the district court's dismissal of a complaint challenging a
recommendation of the credentials committee to unseat the Ilinois delegation was
proper. The court held that such action was warranted under party rules and thus
granted no relief to the Illinois complainants. 92 S. Ct. at 2719.
23. 92 S. Ct. at 2720. The case, No. 1315-72, was decided in the district court
on July 3; the court of appeals entered its judgment on July 5 and the Court rendered
its opinion on July 7.
24. Id. at 2719-20.
25. Id. at 2720.
26. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), cited in O'Brien at 2720.
27. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-44. The President had power to act pursuant to
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ment of the issue to a coordinate branch of government was not present in O'Brien, a point made clear by Justice Marshall in his dissent:
Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of government
purports to have jurisdiction over the claims asserted in these cases.
Apart from the judicial forum, only one other forum has been suggested-the full convention of the National Democratic Partyand that is most assuredly not a coordinate branch of government
to which the federal courts owe deference within the meaning
of
the separation of powers or the political question doctrine. 28
Another factor traditionally regarded as commanding application
of the political question doctrine-that of the absence of judicially
manageable standards-was also absent in O'Brien. Essentially, the
Court was asked to determine whether certain rules adopted by the
Democratic Party violated any constitutional provisions, and if not,
whether those rules were properly applied. As Justice Marshall said,
these determinations were "well within the range of questions regularly
presented to courts for decision, and capable of judicial resolution. 2 9
Therefore, whereas the factors of haste and ripeness were justifiable
grounds for staying the judgment of the court of appeals in O'Brien,
the political question doctrine should not have been a basis for the decision.3 0
Even assuming arguendo that the political question doctrine was
properly applied in O'Brien, this would not require its application to
prevent judicial review of the processes by which national convention
delegates are selected. A substantial distinction can be made between
issues which concern the seating of delegates and those which pertain
to the selection of delegates. The latter do not require an entry into
the deliberative processes of a convention. Nor do the latter require
haste in decision making, a factor often present in challenges to delegate seating.
Irish v. Democratic/Farmer-LaborParty3' is the one case which
has held that the political question doctrine precluded judicial review
an act of Congress. Id. at 43. The power of Congress to determine the issue arose
from the republican guarantee clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2723-24.
29. Id. at 2724.

30.

Other cases arising in 1972 in connection with national convention dele-

gate seating disputes are Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 344 F. Supp. 908
(S.D. Miss. 1972), stay denied No. 72-2437, 5th Cir. July 8, 1972, and Wigoda v.
Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill.), - F.2d (7th Cir.), 92 S. Ct. 2610 (stay
denied by Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, July 1, 1972). In these cases the courts refused to
enjoin the seating of challenging delegations. See generally Schmidt and Whalen,
Credentials Contests at the 1968and 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82

HARv. L. Rav. 1438 (1969) for a critical study of the Democratic Credentials Committee.
31.

287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
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of delegate selection. When asked to apply one person-one vote
standards to the selection of national convention delegates, the court
referred to the lack of standards as the basis of its decision. However,
since equal protection standards in malapportionment cases were already well established at the time of its decision, the case seems
wrongly decided. Yet, as in O'Brien, the time factor was perhaps
crucial. Irish was given expedited consideration in the court of appeals. Appellate review was completed very shortly after the district
court ruling and only thirteen days before the Democratic National
Convention was to begin.
Irish and O'Brien notwithstanding, the federal courts have consistently shown greater activism where time has permitted a considered
review of electoral structures. This is clearly shown in the Texas
White Primary Cases.3 2 Moreover, an analysis of the tests set out in
Baker v. Carr33 to determine the presence of a nonjusticiable controversy would not compel the application of the doctrine to the selection
of convention delegates. Since the political parties are not, per se,
branches of the government, the factor of the commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department would not arise in this context.
In view of the long series of cases articulating one person-one vote
standards in matters involving malapportionment of representative
bodies, the element of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards would not be an obstacle. 34 Lastly, the contention that the
application of equal protection standards to the selection of delegates
would be a determination clearly for nonjudicial discretion should similarly be rejected.
The political question doctrine would not seem to be any more
applicable to the selection of convention delegates than it is to matters
pertaining to the election of governmental officials such as members
of Congress and state legislators. The "mere fact that the suit seeks
protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political
question."' 5 Another recent decision of the Court in the area of
presidential elections supports this conclusion of the inapplicability of
32. See Texas White Primary Cases at note 48, infra.
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34. See cases cited notes 4-7 supra.
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). Subsequent to Baker the Court
stated: "We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets ...
Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 566 (1964). With respect to the treatment given the political question doctrine
in these cases, one commentator has written: "It is hard to mourn the enfeeblement
of a doctrine that has served this obscurantist purpose." R. McCLosnnY, TIM MODERN
SuPREME COURT 274 (1972).
:-
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the doctrine. In Williams v. Rhodes,"6 a case concerning candidate
access to the presidential ballot, claims under the doctrine were given
only brief consideration and then were peremptorily dismissed.1 7 For
these reasons, the political question doctrine should not prevent the
judicial review of the selection processes of national convention delegates.
State Action
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
is preconditioned upon a finding of state action,3 8 has been the basis of
decision in all of the one person-one vote cases. 9 Although matters
pertaining to the nomination of a presidential candidate would clearly
seem to constitute state action, in Smith v. State Executive Committee"° a federal district court refused to apply equal protection standards
to the selection of national convention delegates on the ground the
state action was lacking. 4 1 More recently, a three judge federal court
in Williams v. Democratic Party of Georgia42 held that the selection of
national convention delegates by local conventions was not state action
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 1973c, which begins with the
words: "Whenever a State or political subdivision ...
" Because of
these cases, a closer review of state action is in order.
Insofar as the presidential primary method of delegate selection is
concerned, the presence of state action is apparent. The primaries,
with one exception, are specifically governed by state law. The only
exception in 1972 was Alabama where the Democratic Party, pursuant
to authority given by state statute, conducted a presidential primary.
However, in MacGuire v. Amos 43 a three judge federal court specifically held that the rules promulgated by the Alabama political parties
36.

393 U.S. 23 (1968).

Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969),

which further narrowed the political question doctrine. Although the action presented a prima facie commitment to the House of Representatives in the seating of
Representative Powell, the Court nevertheless reached the merits.
37. 393 U.S. at 28.
38.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
But see R.G. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS 135-37 (1968) where it is argued that legislative apportionment

39.

should have been decided under the due process or republican guarantee clauses because
equal protection provides too simplistic a formula which, in light of gerrymandering
and multi-member districts, fails to provide for truly representative legislative bodies,
40. 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
41. Id. at 373-74. However, as in O'Brien and Irish, supra notes 21 and 31,
the time factor could have been significant since the action was decided only three
days before the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
42. No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. April 6, 1972).
43. 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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to govern the election of their delegates to the national convention
amounted to state action.4 4 The three judge court in this case was also
construing 42 U.S.C. section 1973c and was aware of the Williams decision when it rendered its judgment. The court in MacGuire distinguished Williams on the factual ground that the latter involved the

selection of delegates by local conventions rather than by a party primary authorized by state statute. 45
In the non-primary states where national convention delegates are

not popularly elected but are chosen under party rules by local conventions or committees, the presence of state action may seem less
certain. In recent years, however, the Court has found the requisite
state action in activities appearing to be of a more private nature.4467
Unquestionably the scope of state action has been broadened.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently found state action in
the activities of political parties by which candidates for public office
are nominated, even though the parties may have acted without statutory authority through their committees or conventions.48 Although
national convention delegates are not candidates for public office, because their major task is the nomination of the candidates for the two

highest offices in the nation, the same rationale should be applicable.
The difference between candidate nomination and delegate selection is
only slight and the analogy is compelling. The state action requirement should therefore present no obstacle to the application of the one
person-one vote principle to the delegate selection processes.
44. Id. at 121.
45. Id. at 121, n.3.
46. E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) which states :"Conduct
that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so
impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action."
47. See generally Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 855 (1966);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. Rv. 347 (1963); Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 1065, 1069-72 (1969). Professor
Charles Black has stated that the state action limit is "a conceptual disaster area."
Black, The Supreme Court-Foreword,81 H~Av. L. Rav. 69, 95 (1967).
48. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas statute preventing blacks
from voting in the Democratic Party primary); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(Texas Democratic State Committee acting under statutory authority excluded blacks
from voting in the party primary); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (resolution of the Texas Democratic State Convention, made without specific statutory authority, denied blacks the right to vote in the primary); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953) (Texas Jaybird Democratic Association prevented blacks from voting in
private primaries which were independent of the state primary). In Terry the Court
held that the lack of a formal primary under state control was not necessary to a
finding of state action since the primary was in fact an integral part of the elective
process. These four cases are collectively known as the Texas White Primary Cases.
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One Person-One Vote and National
Convention Delegate Selection
The one person-one vote cases are based upon the principle that
"a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections without
having his vote wrongfully denied, debased or diluted."' 9 In essence
this means that the vote of a citizen must be "approximately equal in
weight to that of any other citizen in the state." 50 In matters pertaining to the apportionment of representative bodies, these principles have
been translated into the objective requirement of "equal representation
for equal numbers of people." 5' 1 The question of the applicability of
one person-one vote standards to the delegate selection processes arises
in three different areas. First, regardless of the particular method of
delegate selection, does one person-one vote demand the allocation of
convention delegates among the states so that delegates will represent
equal numbers of party members? Second, in non-primary states
where delegates are chosen indirectly by elected party officials rather
than directly by party members, must the elected party representatives
who chose the delegates represent equal numbers of the party membership? Finally, in primary states, after votes for delegates have been
cast, does one person-one vote require the distribution of delegates in
proportion to the votes received by the presidential candidates they
represent?
Allocation of Convention Delegates Among the States
The application of apportionment principles to the formulas by
which the national parties allocate their convention delegates among
the several states has been a matter greatly litigated recently. 5 2 Even
though the questions in this area are one step removed from the issues
of how delegates are chosen, still the courts have had no trouble in
dismissing political question claims5" or in finding the requisite state
action. 54 All of the decisions have been rendered on the merits.
49. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 52 (1970).
50. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
51. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
52. See Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Ripon Society Inc. v.
National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-1633 D.C. Cir., July 5, 1972.
53. See Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d at 1305; Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d at 1276-78; Ripon Society Inc. v. National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. at 174.
54. See Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d at 1304-05; Georgia v.
National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d at 1274-76; Ripon Society Inc. v. National
Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. at 173-74.
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In Georgia v. National Democratic Party55 the argument was
made that the Republican and Democratic party conventions must be
reapportioned so that each delegate would represent equal segments of
the national population. In a per curiam opinion, this contention was
rejected:
While population may be an appropriate measuring rod when publie officials are to be elected and held responsible to the entire citizenry, population alone is an inappropriate test of representation
in the framework of national politics where parties compete for
membership. 56
In the subsequent case of Bode v. National Democratic Party5"
judges from the same court refused to hold that delegates must be allocated soley on the basis of party strength-one Democrat, one vote.5 8
The opinion tested by equal protection standards a Democratic plan
which allocated approximately half of the national convention delegates on the basis of Democratic voting strength and the other half on
the basis of electoral college strength. The court concluded that the
plan was constitutionally valid. The court stated that reliance solely
upon party strength was unacceptable since the task of identifying and
counting Democrats was impossible. 59 Deviations from exact mathematical equality were justified on the ground that the overall apportionment plan had "independent rationality."'6 0 The Bode court felt
that the employment of an electoral college factor was rational since
the outcome of the presidential election depends upon the electoral
college vote. The court reasoned that the use of such a factor would
assist the party in attaining its goals of national support and election
victory.
The third case concerning national party delegate allocation formulas, Ripon Society Inc. v. National Republican Party,61 is still in
litigation. At issue is the validity of the apportionment of approximately one-fifth of the Republican delegates on the basis of Republi55. 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
56. Id. at 1278-79.
57. 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
58. Id. at 1305-06.
59. Id. at 1307. It would seem, however, that an accurate membership count
could be obtained by reference to the number of registered Democrats in each state.
Cf. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), where the Court permitted an apportionment plan to be based upon the number of registered voters.
60. 452 F.2d at 1309. In other cases involving apportionment of state legislatures and local governmental units, the Supreme Court has similarly indicated that variations from strict equality may be tolerated where justified by rational policy. See
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Swam v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444
(1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
61. 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1633 D.C. Cir.,
July 5, 1972.
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can victories in certain election contests, rather than on population or
party membership. The federal district court held the apportionment
standard unconstitutional and prohibited the use of factors other than
electoral college strength or party membership as determined by votes
for Republican candidates.6 2 This result would appear to be consistent with that reached in Bode.
Yet the result reached in Bode, and dutifully followed in the
Ripon Society case, is subject to criticism. The Bode court justified
the allocation of delegates on an electoral college factor because it has
constitutional status in presidential elections and on the ground that
"the constituency for a national convention comprises to a certain degree the entire electorate." 63 The difficulties with these propositions
are twofold. First, the electoral college only remotely reflects the distribution of the electorate among the several states. Disparities from
64
equal voting power within the college are gross and substantial.
This inequality results from the fact that the presidential electors are allocated to each state by constitutional provision in a number equal to
the total of senators and representatives from that state.6" Since each
state has at least one representative and all states have only two senators, an imbalance necessarily results. It is only because the electoral
college is engrained in the Constitution that it escapes scrutiny under
one person-one vote standards.
Second, the constitutional validation of the college was the result
of a series of compromises that implied nothing about the use of analogous systems in other contexts.66 Thus the Supreme Court has rejected analogies to the electoral college in elections of state legislators6 7
62. Id. at 178. The district court issued an injunction enjoining the 1972 Republican convention from adopting a formula for its 1976 convention that would employ factors other than electoral college strength or Republican candidate votes. However, five days prior to the convening of the Republican convention, the district court
injunction was stayed. Republican State Central Comm. v. Ripon Society Inc., No.
A-179 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, Aug. 16, 1972).
63. 452 F.2d at 1306.
64. According to the 1970 census California had a population of 19,953,134 or
almost sixty-six times the population of Alaska which totaled 302,173. Yet in the
electoral college California has 45 votes or only fifteen times that of Alaska which
has 3 votes. An Alaskan, therefore, has more than four times the voting power of a
Californian in the electoral college. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, 1-297 and 1-298 (Doc. No. PC(l)BI January 1972).

65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
66. The method of choosing a president was a compromise that was reached
only after some sixty ballots were cast at the Constitutional Convention. See C.D.
BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 189 (1966).

67. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
571-76 (1964).
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and statewide officers. 68 Moreover, the electoral college has constitutional status only in the final presidential election, not in the nomination of presidential candidates. The historical evidence is clear that
the framers of the Constitution could not have intended the use of the
collegiate principle in the presidential nominating processes since they
could not have anticipated the rise of the two party system or its system of presidential nominations. 69 In view of the lack of specific constitutional authority for employing electoral college analogies in the
nominating processes and the inherent numerical inequality of the college, arguments for its use in apportioning delegates are far less than
compelling. 70
Non-Primary States-Indirect Selection of Convention Delegates

Among the states which do not conduct presidential primaries,
methods for the selection of convention delegates defy categorization.
The specific selection procedures vary widely. They are not delimited
by statute but are controlled by party regulation. 71 Generally, these
procedures provide for the selection of national convention delegates
by party representatives. The representatives are usually elected by
party members to serve on state committees or to participate in state
or congressional conventions. "Grass-root" voter influence in the final
selection of national convention delegates is therefore only indirect.
When national convention delegates are chosen by elected party representatives, the issue arises whether the vote of each of those representatives must be weighted in proportion to the voting strength of the constituency that elected them. The opinions of legal writers on this issue
are substantially unanimous in favor of applying equal apportionment
68. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963).
69. See S.E. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 309
(1965).
70. See generally Bellamy, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Allocation of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 892 (1970); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Require a Particular
Formula for the Allocation of Delegates to a National Convention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1331
(1972); Note, Bode v. National Party: Apportionment of Delegates to National
PoliticalConventions, 85 Hnv. L. Rnv. 1460 (1972).
One other case has concerned delegate allocation formulas, but at the congressional district rather than the state level. In Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153
(D. Md. 1972), appeal dismissed, No. 72-1412, 4th Cir., June 29, 1972, an attack was
made on a Maryland statute that apportioned delegates from that state among the
congressional districts solely on the basis of general population. The district court
barred the claim on the ground of laches and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed as moot an appeal of that decision.
71. See Mandate for Reform: A Report of the Commission on Party Structure
and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, 117 CONG. Rnc. E9848
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1971).
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standards. 71 Yet, among the courts that have considered the applicability of the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of
people in this area, there is a division of authority.
7 the issue
In Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor-Party
was not
reached since the court disposed of the case on grounds of nonjusticiability. Another case, Smith v. State Executive Committee,74 held that
one person-one vote standards did not apply since state action was
lacking. However, dicta in both cases indicated that beyond the political question and state action issues, one person-one vote would not apply to the selection of convention delegates. The courts intimated that
where one person-one vote principles were followed at the initial level
of selection, secondary selection processes could be conducted on a
malapportioned basis.7 5 In making these arguments, reliance was
77
placed upon Fortson v. Morris76 and Sailors v. Board of Education.
In Fortson the Supreme Court upheld the election of the Georgia
governor by a malapportioned legislature. The decision should not,
however, be construed as permitting malapportionment at secondary
levels. The holding was predicated upon the fact that the Georgia legislature was still authorized to act until a previous order to reapportion
could be effected.7 8 Reliance upon Sailors would similarly appear to
72. See Segal, Delegate Selection Standards, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1970);
Note, Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution in the Presidential Nomination
Procedure, 54 IowA L. REV. 471 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Reform of State
Delegate Selection to National Party Conventions, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 915 (1970);
Note, The PresidentialNomination: Equal Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL.
L. REv. 169 (1969); Note, One Man-One Vote in the Selection of Presidential
Nominating Delegates by State Party Conventions, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 349 (1971);
Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228 (1969). Contra, Note, One Man, One Vote and
the Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
536 (1970).
73. 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), aff'g 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1968). See text
accompanying note 31 supra. In Irish, county conventions were all allowed to elect a
minimum of six delegates to the state convention irrespective of their population. The
state convention, which elected national convention delegates, was therefore malapportioned.
74. 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
Smith involved national convention delegates who were chosen by the state committee
of the Democratic party. One half of these state committee members were chosen by
county committees that did not vote on a basis proportionate to the size of their
constituencies.
75. Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor-Party, 399 F.2d at 120: "What was done
at the precinct level was in full accord with the one man-one vote principle. What
took place thereafter was not the product of malapportionment." See also Smith v.
State Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. at 377.
76. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
77. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
78. 385 U.S. at 235.
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be misplaced. That case held constitutional the selection of a county
school board by popularly elected local school boards whose votes were
not weighted in accordance with the size of their constituencies. Yet,
it is clear that the Court, in making its judgment, gave great consideration to the fact that the county board performed essentially administrative functions which, while important, were not legislative in the classical sense. 79 Since the nomination of a presidential candidate cannot
be regarded as only an administrative determination, the Sailors rationale is not particularly persuasive. Furthermore, the legislativeadministrative dichotomy was subsequently abandoned by the Court in
Hadley v. Junior College District.80 The issue in Hadley was whether
the one person-one vote principle applied where junior college trustees
were popularly elected. The Court held that such standards are applicable "whenever a state or local government decides to select persons
by popular election to perform governmental functions. . .. "I'
Ostensibly many functions of a convention, such as the drafting
of a party platform and the selection of party officers, are not governmental in character. However, when conventions make nominations
for public office they directly affect the electoral processes and enter
into a domain traditionally regarded as governmental in nature."2 Although Hadley concerned only malapportionment among governmental
officials directly elected by the people, the result should apply equally
to cases where popular sentiment is expressed only indirectly through
secondary selection groups. Such application would be consistent with
the principle stated by the Court that:
All procedures used by a State as an integral part of the election
process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or
of abridgment of the right to vote. 3
79. 387 U.S. at 110.
80. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
81. Id. at 56. In Wells v. Edwards, 41 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. January 8, 1973),
aff'g 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), and Holshouser v. Scott, 93 S.Ct. 43 (1972),
aff'g 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. N.C. 1971), the Supreme Court affirmed lower court
judgments that refused to apply the one person-one vote principle to the election of
judges. The cases are reconcilable with past decisions. While judges are governmental
officials, their task is only to interpret the law. They do not have a representative
function. In contrast, national convention delegates are representatives of the people.
The extension of the one person-one vote principle to the selection of national convention delegates therefore is not prohibited by Wells or Holshouser.
82. See Texas White Primary Cases, note 48 supra.
83. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969). The integral relationship test
was also employed in Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Georgia v. National Democratic: Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1276 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 318 (1941). Party nomination has long been recognized as a highly important
part of the electoral process. "[P]rimary elections-and nominating conventions are...
closely related to the final election .... As a practical matter, the ultimate choice of
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The selection of national convention delegates is an integral part
of the process which leads to the election of a president. It is only
logical and appropriate that processes integral to party nominations
should be subject to the same constitutional standards. Thus, one
person-one vote standards should apply at all stages of the delegate
selection processes. Three courts have followed these lines of reasoning and reached such a conclusion. In holding that equal protection
standards apply when national convention delegates are chosen by
county and state conventions, the district court in Maxey v. Washington State DemocraticCommittee8" stated:
If the teaching of the Reynolds and Gray cases could be subverted
simply by imposing an unrepresentative convention hierarchy
upon a system which requires equal voting power only at the lowest level, the one-man-one-vote principle would be illusory. 85
Similar results were reached in Doty v. Montana State Central
Committee86 and Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Committee.8 7 Moreover, their results are in harmony with Bode v. Nathe mass of voters is predetermined when the nominations have been made." Newberry
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-86 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring). "[The same
tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgment should be applied to
the primary as are applied to the general election." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 664 (1944).

See Texas White Primary Cases, note 48 supra.

84. 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970), appeal dismissed, No. 71-1051, 9th
Cir. Feb. 13, 1973 (appeal dismissed pursuant to Fed. Rules App. Proc. 42(b)).
85. 319 F. Supp. at 680. However, the court in Maxey held that the allocation
of delegates must "be made on some rational population basis." Id. at 679. But see
Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), note 55 and
accompanying text supra.
86. 333 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mont. 1971). The court here enjoined the state Democratic party from "nominating candidates to fill vacancies for elective offices or electing
delegates who have any part in the selection of delegates to the national presidential
nominating convention" on any basis other than one Democrat, one vote. Id. at 52.
Apportionment on this basis may be contrary to the decision in Bode v. Democratic
National Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), supra notes 57-59. However, a distinction can probably be made between the problems of identifying Democrats for the
purpose of allocating delegates prior to their selection, and the problems encountered in
determining the number of Democrats represented by a precinct committee after its
election.
87. 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972). While the court in Seergy did not specifically
include the selection of national convention delegates among its examples of
the types of party acts that would be governed by the one person-one vote standard, convention delegate selection should certainly be within its holding. The
court variously described its ruling as applying to party acts integral to the electoral process; to acts playing a major part in determining a party nominee; or to
performing a public electoral function. Id. at 315. Seergy also held that equal protection demanded a one Republican, one vote standard. Id. at 314. But see Bode v.
National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), supra note 57. The
Seergy court was aware of Bode, however, and intimated that its decision was not contrary to it. Id. at 315 n.8.
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tional Democratic Party88 which used equal protection standards to
measure the allocation of national delegates. If equal protection
standards must apply to the manner in which convention delegates are
allocated among the states, it would be inconsistent not to apply the
same standard of review to the selection of those delegates. Otherwise
the protections secured in the allocation phase could be lost in the
selection phase. It should be noted, however, that these cases apply
one person-one vote to the political parties only insofar as they perform
public electoral functions. The decisions do not extend to votes taken
within party committees and conventions which pertain to internal
89

party matters.
In judging the validity of plans apportioning national convention

delegates, however, notice should be taken that the equal protection
clause will tolerate small deviations from mathematical equality if
justified by rational considerations. Recently the Supreme Court in

Mahan v. Howellsoa approved a state legislative apportionment plan
that contained a total variation from average district size of nearly
seventeen percent. The deviations were permissible since the districts
were drawn along lines that preserved the integrity of political sub88. 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
89. Dahli v. Republican State Committee, 319 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1970);
Lynch v. Torquato, 228 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir.
1965); Azvedo v. Jordan, 237 Cal. App. 2d 521, 47 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1965); Rogers v.
State Committee of Republican Party, 96 N.J. Super. 265, 232 A.2d 852 (1967);
Davis v. Sullivan, 47 Misc. 2d 60, 261 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Gallant v.
LaFrance, 101 R.I. 299, 222 A.2d 567 (1966); State v. Bivens, 150 W. Va. 773, 149
S.E.2d 284 (1966).
Although none of these cases concerned the equal protection
problems of party officials nominating candidates for public office or national convention delegates, the court of appeals in Lynch stated in dicta that the "choice of delegates to party national conventions for the nomination of candidates for President
would seem logically to be covered by plaintiff's view of the reach of the equal protection clause." 343 F.2d 370, 372 n.5 (3d Cir. 1965).
89a. 41 U.S.L.W. 4277 (U.S. February 21, 1973). The Court stated that while
the 16.4% total variation "may well approach tolerable limits, we do not believe it
exceeds them." Id. at 4281. Prior to Mahan the most stringent mathematical standard
that was imposed in determining the validity of a state legislative apportionment plan
was stated in Swam v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). There the Court held invalid a
plan that allowed a total variation from average district size of 25.6%. Both state
legislative and local government apportionment plans have consistently been tested
under a somewhat flexible equal protection standard that permits deviations from precise equality if they are justified by rational policy. See note 60 supra. In contrast,
congressional apportionment plans are judged solely under U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 n. 10 (1964). That provision has been interpreted
to require strict adherence to the principle of one person-one vote. In Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court held invalid a congressional apportionment
plan that allowed a total variation of 5.97%. The Court stated that Art. I, § 2 "requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality."
Id. at 530-531.
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divisions. Presumably the standards set forth in Mahan would apply
in the apportionment of national convention delegates.
Primary States-Distribution of Delegates in Proportion to
Votes Received by Candidates
A common feature of the presidential primary systems in 1972
was their failure to precisely translate popular voting sentiment for
presidential candidates into national convention delegate strength.
Thousands of votes were cast for candidates in the presidential primaries without any impact in terms of delegate commitments to those
candidates. In effect, those votes were cast only for the purpose of
being discarded. Since the election results in the 1972 presidential
primaries revealed wide disparities between the popular voting percentages for presidential candidates and the percentages of national
convention delegates committed to vote for those candidates,9" some
review of these primary systems is in order. While no general statement will suffice to indicate the intricate variations that existed among
the laws of the twenty-three jurisdictions which conducted presidential
primaries in 1972, certain broad features existed from which basic distinctions can be made. Essentially, there were four types of primaries.
The first type was the statewide winner-take-all primary. In
1972 four states-California, Oregon, Rhode Island and South Dakota
-and the District of Columbia held this type of presidential primary.
All the delegates from these jurisdictions became committed to vote for
the statewide winner of that primary. The losing candidates for president received no delegate commitments, irrespective of their percentage
of the popular voteY1
90. See Appendix for the disparity between popular vote totals and delegate
commitment totals.
91. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6201 (West 1961); id. § 6386 (West Supp. 1972); Pub.
L. No. 92-220, § 7(5) (Dec. 23, 1971) (amending section 5 of the District of Columbia Elections Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1105 (West 1966) ); ORE. REV. STAT. §
249.221(2) (1971); Act of Jan. 26, 1972, ch. 2, § 17-12.1-11, R.I. Pub. Laws; S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-6-52 (1967).
Theoretically, the commitment of the delegates to vote for the winning candidate
did not extend in any case beyond the first three ballots. Pub. L. No. 92-220 § 7(5)
(Dec. 23, 1971) (amending section 5 of the District of Columbia Election Act, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1105 (West 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 249.221(2) (1971); Act of
Jan. 26, 1972, ch. 2, § 17-12.1-3, R.I. Pub. Laws; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-53.2 (Supp. 1972). But see CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6343 (West Supp. 1972) in which the

Democratic Party delegate's commitment lasts until the winning candidate releases
the delegate or the candidate receives less than fifteen percent of the votes at the convention. Other national party primary delegates must pledge to support the candidate "to the best of [their] judgment and ability." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6057(g)
(West 1961). In practice, however, because the delegates certified are members of a
slate already committed to the state's winning candidate, the real commitment of the
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The second type of primary combined a winner-take-all feature
with elections primarily at the congressional district level, rather than
the statewide level. The majority of national convention delegates
from the state were allocated among the congressional districts with
only a few designated as statewide delegates. 9s The delegates from
the congressional districts became obligated to vote for the presidential
candidate with the highest number of votes in that district. The at
large delegates became committed to vote for the overall winner
throughout the state. The losing candidates in each congressional district and on the statewide basis did not receive any delegates.93 The
states with this type of primary structure included Florida, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Tennessee and Wisconsin.
The third type of primary provided for the election of national
convention delegates on a basis somewhat proportional to the statewide popular vote. In contrast, the statewide and congressional district winner-take-all primaries did not achieve such proportional results. In Michigan, delegates were allocated proportionately among all
the candidates that received at least 5 percent of the total popular
vote. 94 New Mexico certified delegates proportionately between the
two candidates who received the most votes.9 5 The North Carolina
statute allowed the distribution of delegates proportionately among the
delegates can exist indefinitely. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6055 (West 1961); Pub. L.
No. 92-220, § 7(3) (A) Dec. 23, 1971) (amending Section 5 of the District of Columbia
Election Act D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1105(b) (3) (A) (West 1966); Act of Jan. 26, 1972,
ch. 2, § 17-12.1-9, R.I. Pub. Laws; S.D. COMPiLED LAWS ANN. §§ 12-6-14, 12-5-3
(1967), as amended (Supp. 1972). Oregon, however, would appear to be an exception to this rule since delegates in that state are elected individually rather than on a
slate basis. See ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 249.221(2), 249.354 (1971).
92. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.101(11) (Supp. 1972-73); MD. ANN. COnE art.
33, § 12-1(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 70B (Supp.
1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (Supp. 1972-73).
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.101(11) (Supp. 1972-73); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-3619
(1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 12-1(b) (Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 53, § 70 I (Supp. 1973); Presidential Preference Primary Act of 1971, ch. 102 § 1
Tenn. Acts; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (Supp. 1972-73). The legal commitment
imposed on the delegates varied greatly from state to state, but did not continue after
the second ballot. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.101(7) (Supp. 1972-73); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 29-3619 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 12-1(b) (Supp. 1972); M~ss. GEN.
LAWs ANN. ch. 53, § 70 I (Supp. 1973); Presidential Preference Primary Act of 1971,
ch. 102 § I Tenn. Acts. But see Wis. STAT. ANN. §8.12(3)(c) (Supp. 1972-73)
(pledge to vote unless released or candidate fails to get one-third of the convention
votes). However, a legal commitment even for only the first ballot is far more significant than may initially appear. In only four of the 'tventy-four major party conventions since 1928 have more than one presidential ballot been taken. See D. VNYARD,
THE PREsmENcY 48 (1971).
94. Act of Feb. 22, 1972, No. 60, Mich. Pub. Acts (6nacting MICH. Com,.
LAws ANN. § 168.619(3) ).
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-40 (1953) as amended (Interim Supp. 1972).
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four candidates receiving the most votes, but only if each such candidate received at least 15 percent of the votes cast in the primary.
The fourth type of primary was used in nine states and provided7
for voter selection of individuals as national convention delegates.9
Six of these states also conducted a presidential preference poll along
with the delegate primary. The results of the poll did not in any way
commit the delegates to vote for any particular candidate at the national convention.9 8 However, since seven of the states permitted
candidates for delegate to signify their commitment or preference for a
presidential nominee on the ballot, the votes cast in the delegate primaries could still greatly determine the outcome of the candidate balloting at the national convention."
Only New York and West Virginia did not have statutory authority for such a notation of candidate
preference. 00
While the third type of primary did grant significant effect to
popular sentiment, all systems described fell short of an exact translation of the popular vote into delegate strength. The principle of one
person-one vote is based upon the recognition that "the right of suf96.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-213.9 (1972).
97. Rules of the Democratic Party as adopted by the State Democratic Exec.
Comm. of Ala. Art. IV § 3 (as amended by resolution of July 24, 1970); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 46, § 7-14.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-542 (1968);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 57:1-:10 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3-5-2 (1971).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:24-1 to -6 (1964), as amended (Supp.
1972) and OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.12 (1972) permit either group or individual
candidates for delegate. New York followed local Democratic Party rules and had individual candidates for delegates with no presidential candidate preferences listed. N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 21 (McKinney 1964); see N.Y. Times, June 20, 1972, at 24, col. 3.
Pennsylvania also followed party rules and elected delegates in 50 state senatorial
districts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2838.1 (Supp. 1972); see N.Y. Times, Apr. 26,
1972, at 28, col. 1.
98. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 32-509 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58:6 (1970).
See N.J. STAT. ANN.
19:25-3 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 2753 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-5-3 (1971).
99. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-10.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 32-504.01; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57:6 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1972);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:24-5 (1964), id. § 19:24-6 (Supp. 1972-73); OHio REV. CODE
§ 3513.12 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 2871 (Supp. 1972-73). Authority for such
signification in Alabama existed by the Rules of the Democratic Party as adopted by the
State Democratic Exec. Comm. of Ala. Art. IV § 3 (as amended by resolution of July
24, 1970).
100. In New York State Democratic Party v. Lomenzo, 460 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.
1972), the New York State Democratic Party sought an injunction compelling the
Secretary of State to allow each candidate for national convention delegate or alternate
to list their preference for presidential candidate on the ballot next to their names.
The denial of the injunction was upheld as not raising a substantial constitutional question. Id. at 251.
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frage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."' 10 1 The denial of national convention delegates to losing presidential candidates, who nonetheless received thousands of votes, would seem contrary to this principle. The issue thus
arises whether one person-one vote standards require the distribution
of delegates on a basis purely proportionate to the outcome of the
presidential candidate voting. 10 2
In Hollifield v. Brown'0 3 a federal district court in California was
called upon to determine this question. The suit was filed shortly
after the statewide presidential primary and sought a writ of mandamus to compel a proportionate award of the Democratic delegates and
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the state laws providing for
the winner-take-all result. Although the time consideration could
have been a critical factor in the decision, the court in denying the
writ nevertheless ruled on the merits and upheld the California primary provisions.104 In making its decision the district court relied on
the Supreme Court cases of Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections' and Whitcomb v. Chavis.'0° The court's application of these
101. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
102. Proportional voting systems have been advocated by democratic theorists for
over a century. See J.S. MILL, Considerations on Representative Government
(1861) in UTIUTAIANISM, LmEaRTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 345-70 (Every-

man's Library ed. 1951).
103. No. S 2489, E.D. Cal., June 23, 1972, appeal docketed, No. 72-2175, 9th
Cir., July 5, 1972. Shortly before the California primary of June 6, 1972, a petition
for a writ of mandamus was filed with the California Supreme Court which sought to
compel a proportionate distribution of the California convention delegates. The writ
was denied without comment; Barron v. Brown, No. SAC 7939 (filed April 28, 1972;
denied May 10, 1972).
104. The case was decided sixteen days after the California primary and only
eighteen days before the Democratic National Convention. Under these circumstances,
it would have been incredible for a court to grant the requested relief, especially in
light of the following admonition by the Supreme Court: "With respect to the timing
of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process
which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or
embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of a court's decree."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964). The laches doctrine may therefore have
been a more appropriate ground for denying the requested relief. See Barthelmes v.
Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153 (1972) at note 70 supra.
105. 393 U.S. 320 (1969), afj'g 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968).
106. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). The Hollifield court avoided any reference to Gordon
v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), a case that arguably involved substantial deviation from
the one person-one vote principle. The Court in that case held constitutional a state
requirement of a sixty percent margin of the votes as a condition to the passage of bond
referenda. However, the Court limited its holding to referenda elections. Matters pertaining to the election of public officials were not encompassed by the decision. The
Court in Gordon stated that it intimated "no view on the constitutionality of a provision
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two cases to the selection processes of national convention delegates is
open to serious question.
The Williams case involved an attack on Virginia statutes which
committed the entire electoral college vote of the state to the presidential candidate who received the greatest number of popular votes.10 7
Since virtually all states have similar provisions compelling such a
winner-take-all result in the electoral college, 0 8 the case presented
questions of great public importance. In a per curiam opinion the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a district court which had
found the system constitutional.' 0 9 The district court reasoned that
the use of this procedure was within the broad range of authority conferred upon state legislatures by Article II, section 1 of the Constitution. 10 The court also relied on the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution which sets forth the manner of selecting a president where no
candidate has received a majority vote in the electoral college."' The
amendment provides that in such instances votes are to be taken by
states, with the representatives from each state having only one vote
which is to be cast according to how the greatest number of representatives from that state voted. The Williams district court inferred
that if a unit rule within the House of Representatives was proper
when it selects a president, a unit rule within the electoral college must
similarly be acceptable." 2 In citing Williams, the Hollijield court assumed that a unit rule was acceptable in the selection of convention
delegates. Yet, whereas the inference from the Constitution may be
appropriate for the final selection of a president, the same inference
does not necessarily follow for the selection of national convention
delegates. At the time of the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
in 1804 the rise of the convention system of nominating candidates
requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small group.

Nor do we decide

whether a State may, consistently with the Constitution, require extraordinary majorities for the election of public officials."

Id. at 8 n.6.

107. See aLso Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966), where the Court
rejected a challenge to the winner-take-all rule of states in electoral college voting. The
action was filed directly with the Court by thirteen states.

Without comment the

Court declined to exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction.
DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:

See generally R.

REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS

567-69

(1968).
108.

E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 18758, 25105

(West 1961); N.Y. ELEC. LAW

§ 290 (McKinney 1964). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1181-A, 1184
(1-A) (1964), as amended (Supp. 1972-73) (one vote to the winner of each of the
two congressional districts and two votes to the statewide winner).
109. 393 U.S. 320 (1969), afl'g 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968).
110. 288 F. Supp. at 628.
111. Id. 626-27.
112. Id.
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was not foreseen.113 Thus, the amendment's validation of the unit
rule should not be construed as a constitutional acceptance of a similar
procedure for the selection of delegates. Moreover, different considerations arise in the selection of national convention delegates, which
are separate and distinct from those that determine how presidential
electors vote. The selection of delegates within each state constitutes
only a preliminary part of the multifaceted processes leading to the
selection of a president. At this level full recognition of voter sentiment is imperative. Failure to give effect to such sentiment can lead
to what the Supreme Court has acknowledged would be an unacceptable result: the "frustration of the majority will through minority
veto.""' 4 In contrast, presidential electors take the final step in what
is truly a winner-take-all election. For these reasons, the principle of
the Williams case should not be applied to the delegate selection processes.
The Hollifield court's reliance on Whitcomb v. Chavis" 5 appears
similarly misplaced. In Whitcomb the contention was made that
multi-member legislative districts are unconstitutional because they
permit political parties with only a slightly stronger position in the district than the opposition to win all of the seats in the district. While
noting the winner-take-all aspects of multi-member districts and their
tendency to overrepresent the winning party, the Court held that they
were not inherently unconstitutional and rejected the challenge."16
The Court reasoned that "the dilution of voting power suffered by a
voter who is placed in a district 10 times the population
of another is
7
cured by allocating 10 legislators to the larger district.""1

Apparently the Hollifield court relied upon Whitcomb on the
premise that elections by multi-member legislative districts and winnertake-all primaries are analogous. However, analogies between the
situation in Whitcomb and the selection of national convention delegates are inappropriate for several reasons. First, some consideration
should be given to the difference in functions performed by state legislators and convention delegates. Although delegates do vote upon
party rules, policy platforms and the selection of party officials, they
really have only one major task: the nomination of a presidential
candidate. In contrast, state legislators vote upon numerous issues of
113. The rise of the political parties and their convention systems of nomination
did not occur until more than two decades later in the Jacksonian period. R. NICHoLs,
THE INVENTION OF THE AMERICAN PoLrIcAL PAPTjus 294 (1967).
114. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964). This comment was made by
the Court in rejecting analogies to the electoral college in state legislature elections.
115. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
116. Id. at 158-60.
117. Id. at 144.
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public importance. As to these issues legislators sometimes may take
positions contrary to the views of the people who elected them. Moreover, representatives serve their districts in ways that go beyond voting. They frequently use their offices to influence the acts of other
governmental branches, such as administrative agencies, with consequences that benefit the residents of their district irrespective of their
party affiliation. The lobbying undertaken by elected representatives
to have governmental construction projects initiated in their districts
is but one example of this feature of the American political system.
It is therefore not accurate to contend that the voters for losing candidates for legislative office are wholly unrepresented. The same conclusion does not follow for the voters for defeated presidential candidates and delegates. These voters are totally unrepresented by delegates who are committed to vote for a different presidential candidate.
Second, while there are valid grounds for not employing a proportional voting system in legislative elections, these reasons are not
applicable to the selection of national convention delegates. In the
post World War II era, Italy and France employed proportional voting
systems in their parliamentary elections with the result that governments changed frequently and generally failed to rule effectively.11 With
respect to such voting systems in legislative elections, Professor Bickel
has commented that:
[T]his is a device . . . known to have a powerful fragmenting effect on government, often paralyzing it by putting the entire burden of coalition formation on the legislature itself, rather than
encouraging
the formation of initial coalitions in the electoral proc19
ess.'

Although proportional voting structures in legislative elections might
well jeopardize the two-party system and threaten governmental stability, such a result would not occur in the context of presidential
candidate nominations by political parties. Rather, the use of a proportional voting system by political parties would strengthen the twoparty system since it would provide for the effective representation of
all elements within the party and thus discourage the formation of
third party movements.
The significant differences in the functions of state legislatures and
national conventions render of doubtful validity the Hollifield court's
118. See H.S. HUGHES, CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: A HISTORY 467, 499-504 (2d
ed. 1966).
119. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN
THE 1970s 71 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
Justice White, speaking for the majority in
Whitcomb, briefly discussed the possibility of using proportional voting systems in multimember districts but concluded that such systems are not required by the Constitution,
403 U.S. at 124.
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application of the holding in Whitcomb to delegate selection processes.
Despite these functional differences, however, the Whitcomb case is
pertinent in one respect. In making its ruling, the Court indicated
that in particular cases multi-member districts might be unconstitutional where they "operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of
racial or political elements. ' '120 The districting plan in Whitcomb was
sustained against attack on this ground. However, in the recent case
of Amos v. Sims' 2 ' the Court affirmed the ruling of a three judge district court rejecting the use of multi-member districts in Alabama.
The district court specifically found that the use tended to discriminate
against minorities. 2 2 Presidential nominating systems which deny
thousands of voters any voice in choosing a presidential candidateand thereby cancel the voting strength of those political elementsshould be similarly invalid under this test.
More apposite to the Hollifield problem than either Williams or
Whitcomb is Gray v. Sanders.12 3 Although the Hollifield decision did
not cite Gray, the case is relevant to the question of proportional delegate distribution. In Gray the Court held unconstitutional the Georgia
county unit system of counting votes in statewide primaries for governor and United States Senator. Since the selection of national convention delegates is a process which is similarly undertaken on a statewide basis, the decision is pertinent. Under the system of nomination
challenged in Gray, candidates who received the highest number of
popular votes in a county were granted the entire unit vote of that
county. The candidate with the most unit votes gained the nomination. The Court ruled that even if the unit votes were allocated
strictly in proportion to population, the system would remain defective
effective disenfranchisement of the
since it would still result in 2the
4
minority voters in each county.
In effect, the Gray Court concluded that equal protection requires
the granting of full force and effect to the ballots of all the voters
within the constituency-the state-in the nomination of senate and
gubernatorial candidates. In the nomination of a presidential candidate, the principle enunciated in Gray would seem to require a voting
system that would similarly preserve and give effect to all of the votes
120. 403 U.S. at 144. Accord, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965);
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
121.

93 S.Ct. 290

(1972),

aff'g 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

See

Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (rejection of the use of multimember districts).
122.

336 F. Supp. at 936.

123.

372 U.S. 368 (1963).

Gray, however, did "not reach

..

the questions that

would be presented were the convention system used for nominating candidates in lieu

of the primary system." Id. at 378, n.1O.
124. Id. at 373, 381 n.12.
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cast for presidential candidates in the various state primaries. The
constituency of a presidential nominee, if elected, is the nation. Therefore, all the voting elements within the nation should have an opportunity to participate effectively in the nominating processes. As Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Clark, said concurring in Gray:
"Within a given constituency, there can
be room for but a single con1 ' 25
stitutional rule-one voter, one vote.'
Conclusion
To avoid the debasement of minority votes condemned in Gray,
proportional voting systems within each state appear to be necessary
in the selection of national convention delegates. In making this conclusion, however, no suggestion is made that the one person-one vote
principle would require the holding of a single national presidential
primary. First, nothing in the Gray decision would demand such a
result. Second, if one person-one vote standards were followed in the
selection of national convention delegates in each state, no violations
of equal protection would result. The Fourteenth Amendment would
therefore not require the holding of a national presidential primary.
Moreover, the conclusion that equal protection does not require a single
national primary is consistent with the principles of federalism implicit
in the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.
On the other hand, the conclusion that equal protection requires
proportional voting in the selection of national convention delegates
applies whether those delegates are selected directly or indirectly by
secondary selection processes. It would be logically inconsistent to
compel proportional voting in the first situation but not the second.
The "inalienable right [of every citizen] to full and effective participation in the political processes ..
"12 would require proportional
voting systems irrespective of the manner of the delegate selection.
Lastly, the strict standard of scrutiny employed by the Court in
judging the validity of infringements on the exercise of the franchise
must be considered.1 27 Where the strict standard applies, "the issue
125. Id. at 382.
126. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
127. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972) (duration of residence
requirements); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (filing fee systems);
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (apportionment in local governmental

units); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205, 209 (1970)

(restriction

of franchise to real property taxpayers in general obligation bond elections); Evans v.

Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) (denial of vote to residents of federal enclaves);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969) (limitation of franchise in
revenue bond referendums to real property taxpayers); Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27, 632 (1969) (limitation of franchise to owners or
lessors of taxable realty); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (presidential
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is not whether the legislative judgments are rational. A more exacting
standard obtains. The issue is whether
[there is] a compelling
state interest to justify [the action of the state]."' 2 8 The Court has
never exhaustively defined the nature of a compelling state interest in
the area of-voting rights. Generally, departures from one person-one
vote standards will be permitted only where they recognize "certain
factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimmation."' 29 The state interest claimed to- be forwarded by non-proportional voting systems such as the winner-take-all primaries is that they
permit a state to concentrate its delegate vote in one candidate thereby
generating greater interest in the primary and allowing the state to
play a greater role at the national convention. These factors do not
seem sufficient to constitute a compelling state interest. National convention delegates represent people-not states. Voting systems that
deny thousands of voters any voice in the presidential nominating processes are of such an inherently discriminatory nature as to be prohibited under this test. The strict standard of scrutiny therefore requires
a proportional voting system in the selection of national convention
delegates.
The application of one person-one vote standards to the presidential nominating processes is a step consistent with the revolution
which began with Baker v Carr1 0 Such application is demanded
by the logic and spirit of the voting and apportionment decisions of the
Supreme Court. Unless the life. has been taken from these cases and
they are now only. much ado about form, it must be concluded that
one person-one vote principles- are .applicable to the processes for-the
selection of national convention -delegates.
James Shinn Graham*
candidate access to ballot); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) (poll taxes); Reynolds v..Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (apportionment of state legislative bodies). But see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), where the Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test
when a state statute limited the granting of absentee ballots. However, m Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the Cotfrt indicated that if the alleged infringement has
"a real and appreciable' impact on the exercise of the franchise" then the strict- standard
of review will be employed. Id. at 144.', The debasement of .votes for the losing candate in the presidential nominating processes would seem to meet this condition.
128. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
129. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695,..7-10.'(1964).
130. 369 U.S. 186.(1962).
:'
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Appendix
With one exception, all of the election returns below are the results certified
by the various secretaries of state. The exception is Indiana where the
returns were provided by the state Democratic Central Committee and are

unofficial tabulations.
Candidate

McGovern
Humphrey
Wallace
Others

Popular Vote

Percentage of
Popular Vote

California
43.50%
38.58%
7.53%
10.39%

1,550,652
1,375,064
268,551
370,251

Delegates

Percentage
of Delegates

100%
0
0
0

District of Columbia
Fauntroy
Others

20,308
8,022

71.68%
28.32%

100%
0

Florida
Wallace
Humphrey
McGovern
Others

526,651
234,658
78,2322
425,01

41.64%
18.56%
6.19%
33.61%

92.59%

7.41%
0
0

Indiana
Humphrey
Wallace
Muskie

310,8377
281,23 3
78,731

46.34%
41.92%
11.74%

71.05%
28.95%

0

Maryland
Wallace
Humphrey
McGovern
Others

219,68' 7
151,98]1
126,97 8
69,48 5

38.67%
26.75%
22.35%
12.23%

84.91%
15.09%

0
0

Massachusetts
McGovern
Humphrey
Wallace
Others

325,67:3
48,92c9
45,80'7
198,10'7

52.65%
7.91%
7.41%
32.03%

100%
0
0
0

Michigan
Wallace
McGovern
Humphrey
Others

809,23'9
425,69 4
249,79 8
103,34 2

50.96%
26.81%
15.72%
6.51%

50.76%
28.79%
20.45%
0
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McGovern
Wallace
Humphrey
Others
Wallace
Sanford
Others
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51,011
44,843
39,768
17,671

New Mexico
33.28%
29.25%
25.94%
11.53%

55.56%
44.44%
0
0

413,518
306,014
101,878

North Carolina
50.34%
37.26%
12.40%

57.81%
42.19%
0

Oregon
McGovern
Wallace
Humphrey
Others
McGovern
Humphrey
Wallace
Others
Wallace
Humphrey
McGovern
Others
McGovern
Humphrey
Wallace
Others

205,328
81,868
51,163
70,285

50.25%
20.03%
12.52%
17.20%

100%
0
0
0

15,603
7,701
5,802
8,758

Rhode Island
41.21%
20.34%
15.32%
23.13%

100%
0
0
0

335,858
78,350
35,551
42,962

Tennessee
68.16%
15.90%
7.22%
8.72%

100%
0
0
0

333,528
233,748
248,676
312,632

Wisconsin
29.55%
20.71%
22.04%
27.70%

80.60%
19.40%
0
0

* The National Democratic Party allocated 34 delegates to Oregon. But, under
the provisions of Ore. Rev. Stat. § 248.320(2)(b) (1971), the state party elected to
send two delegates to the national convention who were not bound by the outcome of
the presidential candidate voting.

